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This essay seeks to develop an integrated account of the workings of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics as a 
theory of economic equilibrium. It begins with a probabilistic description of general systems (made out of numerous 
elements), based on the practice of statistical physics and the work of E. T. Jaynes, and a self-contained overview of the 
arguments that lead to the concept of statistical entropy as a measure of uncertainty or disorder  and the maximum 
statistical entropy principle. This provides the conceptual setting for developing a statistical mechanical model of general 
equilibrium in pure exchange economies, inspired by the statistical theory of markets of Duncan K. Foley. Emphasis is 
placed in the derivation of the properties of the entropy function of an economy—the maximized statistical entropy as a 
function of the amounts of resources in that economy. We then show that the statistical  equilibrium  theory of pure 
exchange economies gives rise to a phenomenological or ‘macro’ theory of resource allocation in the image of classical 
thermodynamics (and the generalized thermodynamics of L. I.  Rozonoer). We thus establish the fundamental principle 
of the phenomenological theory—the maximum entropy principle—and illustrate its use for the study of isolated and 





This essay seeks to develop an integrated account of  the workings of statistical mechanics and 
thermodynamics as a theory of economic equilibrium. It is worth recalling
1 that statistical mechanics 
(or  statistical physics)  is concerned with the study of macroscopic physical systems from the 
microscopic point of view (i.e. on the basis of the atomic or molecular structure of matter). The part 
of statistical mechanics that is concerned with systems in equilibrium is usually referred  to  as 
statistical thermodynamics; it forms a bridge between classical thermodynamics and molecular 
physics. Classical (or equilibrium) thermodynamics or simply thermodynamics
2, on the other hand, 
is a macroscopic or phenomenological physical theory, that is, a theory in which the atomic or 
molecular structure of matter is ignored. It is grounded on generalizations of empirical regularities in 
the form of axioms, known as the laws of thermodynamics, from which one derives mathematical 
relations between observable properties of macroscopic physical systems in equilibrium. These laws 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Balian (1991) and McQuarrie (2000). 
2 There are a few alternative formulations of thermodynamics. Unless otherwise stated, thermodynamics in 
this essay is identified with its neo-Gibbsian formulation, exemplified by Callen (1985), Tisza (1977), and 
Wightman (1979). Since it is only at the end of the essay that nonequilibrium thermodynamics will be 
mentioned, we will use the term thermodynamics as an abbreviation for equilibrium thermodynamics.    2 
are obtained as theorems in statistical thermodynamics
3, which, in addition, provides the means to 
calculate physical properties (as opposed to thermodynamics which provides only relations between 
many properties). 
 
In the course of  the past ten years,  Foley (1994, 19996a, b, 2003) has elaborated a statistical 
equilibrium theory of markets along the lines of statistical thermodynamics. The intention of that 
work is to transcend the confines of the Walrasian paradigm and thereby the Arrow-Debreu model
4 
of general equilibrium [ Arrow and Hahn (1971), Debreu (1959)]. Earlier, Wilson (1970) worked out 
a systematic statistical mechanical approach to urban and regional modeling
5.  That statistical 
mechanics should be relevant for the study of non-physical systems is not paradoxical. After the 
pioneering work of E. T. Jaynes
6, statistical physics may be seen as an  instance of a formalism or 
generalized statistical mechanics, which is independent of physical properties and  therefore 
applicable to a variety of disciplines
7. To put it otherwise, statistical mechanics may be viewed as 
applied probability theory, more specifically as probability theory with constraints [Sornette (2004)].    
 
To avoid confusion with the physical entropy of thermodynamics, we shall follow the Balian (1991) 
vocabulary regarding key statistical mechanical and thermodynamic terms. Thus when entropy 
signifies a measure of uncertainty or disorder associated with a probability distribution, it will be 
called statistical entropy rather than ‘entropy’. Accordingly, the ‘principle of maximum entropy’ of 
Jaynes will be referred to as the maximum statistical entropy principle. The term entropy function, 
which corresponds to the physical entropy of thermodynamics, will be reserved for the maximum 
value function associated with certain constrained statistical entropy maximization problems, i.e. for 
the maximized statistical entropy as a function of the constraint constants.               
 
While the subjects of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics are firmly interconnected in the 
realm of physics, this has not been the case with their counterparts in other disciplines. One of the 
objectives of this essay is to show that such a deep interconnection does obtain in economics as well. 
We intend to construct a coherent narrative that begins with generalized statistical mechanics as 
general systems theory, continues with the combination of statistical mechanics and microeconomics 
that  results in  the statistical theory of markets, and concludes with  the derivation of  a 
phenomenological theory of resource allocation in the image of thermodynamics. For if such  a 
theoretical  narrative cannot be told, the separate applicability of statistical mechanics and 
thermodynamics to economics, however insightful and important, is  nothing but the transfer of 
useful techniques from one discipline to another; it does not constitute an alternative,  unified 
theoretical perspective.   
 
                                                 
3 This is a simplified description of the relation between statistical physics and classical thermodynamics, 
but adequate for the purposes of this essay—see, for instance, Yi (2003) for the subtleties of this 
relationship.  
4 This is the prevalent name of the theory, even though there other important contributors, most notably 
McKenzie (2003). 
5 The recent outburst of writings on the use of statistical mechanical methods in finance, also known as 
econophysics, is beyond the scope of this essay—it will be taken up in future papers. 
6 See Rosenkrantz (1989) for a collection of important papers by Jaynes on probability, statistics, and 
statistical physics, including his first two seminal papers published in Physical Review in 1957. See also 
Jaynes (2003) for amore detailed account of his views on probability theory. 




The influence of thermodynamics to the formation of mathematical economics is well-known. The 
methods of classical thermodynamics, as perfected by the great American physicist J. Willard Gibbs 
(1839-1903), inspired Samuelson’s path-breaking  1947  book on constrained optimization and 
comparative statics in economic analysis [Samuelson (1983)]. Samuelson (1989) himself gives a 
fascinating account of the influence of G ibbs in modern economics.  He makes it crystal clear, 
though, that the benefit to theoretical economics comes from the ‘mathematical  isomorphisms’ 
between the maximum-minimum structures of thermodynamics and the cost-profit-utility systems of 
economics. 
  
Yet numerous attempts have been made to show that the affinity of thermodynamics to economics is 
much closer
8. The generalized thermodynamics of Rozonoer (1973) is particularly interesting for our 
purposes: it is a thorough and systematic attempt to obtain a phenomenological theory of resource 
allocation from a synthesis of thermodynamics and economics, including the general equilibrium 
theory of pure exchange economies. More recently, Smith and Foley (2002) have also developed a 
systematic thermodynamic reading of neoclassical utility and general equilibrium theory. The great 
virtue of the paper by Smith and Foley is their demonstration that “the correspondence of utility 
theory to thermodynamics defines a whole consistent methodology, and not just a set of analogies” 
[Smith and Foley (2002, p. 22)].   Indeed, in a remarkable paper Candeal et al. (2001) have shown 
that the mathematical structure of the utility representation problem is identical to that of the entropy 
representation problem in the Caratheodory version of classical thermodynamics.  The preference 
ordering of an individual agent corresponds to the ordering of the states of a macroscopic system 
(dictated by the Second Law of thermodynamics). So this mathematical association relates 
individual agents to the macroscopic systems of classical thermodynamics, and not to the particles of 
Newtonian mechanics.   
  
While immensely insightful, the formal equivalence between utility and thermodynamic entropy 
does not address the main concern of this essay, namely, the interconnection between the statistical 
mechanical and thermodynamic accounts. We will follow a different route—the route opened up by 
Foley’s statistical theory of markets. We will be able to show (by means of the maximum statistical 
entropy principle) that every trader in a pure exchange economy is fully characterized by her entropy 
function, which looks like a neoclassical utility function, but is a fundamentally different concept. It 
describes our best prediction of the agent’s behavior on the basis of knowing just her preferred 
action set (i.e. the consumption bundles weakly preferred to her endowment) and the expected value 
of her action.    
 
In Section 1, we present a probabilistic description of general systems (made out of numerous 
elements), based on the practice of statistical physics and the work of  Jaynes, and a self-contained 
overview of the arguments that lead to the concept of statistical entropy as a measure of uncertainty 
or disorder and the maximum statistical entropy principle. This provides the conceptual setting for 
developing a statistical mechanical model of general equilibrium in pure exchange economies in 
Sections 2 and 3, inspired by the statistical theory of markets of Foley. Emphasis is placed in the 
derivation of the  properties of the entropy function of an economy—the maximized statistical 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Burley and Foster (1994).   4 
entropy as a function of the amounts of resources in that economy. We then show in Section 4 that 
the statistical equilibrium theory of pure exchange gives rise to a phenomenological or ‘macro’ 
theory of resource allocation in the image of classical thermodynamics (and the generalized 
thermodynamics of Rozonoer). We thus establish the fundamental principle of the phenomenological 
theory—the maximum entropy principle. In  Section 5, we develop a generalized version of the 
maximum entropy principle and illustrate its workings in the cases of fully heterogeneous agents and 
small open economies. Finally, Section 6 is devoted to some concluding remarks.  
 
 
1. Probabilistic Description of Systems and Statistical Entropy  
 
Following the practice of statistical mechanics [Balian (1991)] we use the term micro-state to signify 
a complete description of a system under investigation—all properties of the system are fully 
specified once its micro-state is known. Any given system is associated with a space  Gof all 
possible micro-states; to avoid issues of convergence of infinite sums or measure theory we will 
presume that  G is a finite set.  We will be concerned with situations where, as in statistical 
thermodynamics, the number of macroscopic data and associated constraints is far from sufficient to 
specify the system’s micro-state. That is, there are many micro-states in  G that are compatible with 
the available data. With this sort of insufficient information about the state of the system, one 
typically resorts to a statistical treatment. 
 
This amounts to giving  Gthe structure of a probability space. Single-point subsets of  G are to be 
viewed as elementary events; we only need to assign probabilities to the latter in order to specify a 
probability measure on the assembly of all events or subsets ofG.  Such a probability assignment is 
usually referred to as a probability distribution or probability law on  Gin the physics or other 
applied probability theory literature. The microscopic description of the system’s macro-state is just 
a probability distribution on . G  
 
Suppose next thatGconsists of  n  distinct micro-states, where n is a positive integer
9, and let 
n p p , , 1 L  be the respective probabilities, which should be nonnegative and add up to one. Thus a 
probability distribution is a vector in the n-1 dimensional unit simplex                 
 
                       { } 1 : 1 = + + ￿ ˛ = D + n
n p p p L                                                                 (1.1)                                          
 
with  i p  being the probability  of the  ith micro-state ( i=1,…,n)  and ). , , ( : 1 n p p p L =                                          
Here 
n
+ ￿  is the non-negative orthant of the n-dimensional Euclidian space
n ￿ ; the symbol := means 
‘by definition equal’. Very schematically, micro-level theory deals with the elements that constitute 
the macroscopic system (along with their interactions) and determines the set  Gof possible micro-
states. All properties of the system are functions of the micro-state and hence random variables on 
. G Their moments can in principle be specified once  p  is known. Thus the selection of  p is a crucial 
step for linking the micro and macro descriptions of the system under study. 
 
                                                 
9 The nature of the micro-states or elementary events is immaterial at this point—what counts is that there 
are a finite number of possible micro-states.   5 
Suppose we do have an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive outcomes of a conceptual experiment—
the set  Gof all possible micro-states of a system under study—but we know nothing else. There is 
no basis—say, on account of symmetry considerations—to single out any particular outcome to be 
more likely than another. Under t hese circumstances,  the  principle of insufficient reason (PIR) 
dictates  that we should assign all the  micro-states equal probabilities
10. That is, the PIR would 
prescribe a uniform probability distribution,  n pi / 1 =  for n i , , 1L = .  
 
The case where the  nmicro-states are equiprobable represents a situation of the greatest uncertainty 
or disorder regarding the predictability of the micro-state. In contrast, there is no uncertainty  or 
disorder  at all if  p   happens to be a  degenerate probability distribution: one of the 
probabilities n p p , , 1 L  is equal to one and all others are equal to zero. The degree of uncertainty or 
disorder is in between these two extremes for all  D ˛ p  that are neither degenerate nor uniform 
probability distributions. The lack of information or measure of uncertainty or degree of disorder 
associated with each probability distribution in  D is quantified by the concept of statistical entropy: 
a function  ￿ ﬁ D : H  defined by 
 
                           i
n
i




- = L ,                                                                               (1.2)                                                     
 
with  k   being an arbitrary positive constant, which we may set equal to one without loss of 
generality
11. It is understood in (1.2) that  . 0 : 0 ln 0 =  
 
It is useful to review some of the properties of statistical entropy in order to confirm that it is a 
reasonable measure of uncertainty or disorder. We note first that H is positive semi-definite and that 
0 ) ( = p H  if and only if  p is a degenerate probability distribution, signifying (as we have just seen) 
complete certainty.  The statistical entropy is positive, on the other hand,  for any non-degenerate 
distribution inD, that is, when the outcome of a conceptual experiment is uncertain. The uniform 
probability distribution    ) / 1 , , / 1 ( n n L  maximizes  H over D, consistently with the notion that the 
greatest uncertainty  or complete disorder obtains when all outcomes are equally likely, namely, 
n pi / 1 = for  . , , 1 n i L = The associated degree of disorder 
 
                          n k n n H ln ) / 1 , , / 1 ( = L                                                                                           (1.3) 
 
is strictly increasing with the number n of micro-states, as expected. Further, it is easy to see that 
H is a continuous and strictly concave function
12.  
 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Grandy (1987) and references therein. 
11 The term ‘statistical entropy’ originated in statistical physics and is still maintained in some theoretical 
texts such as Balian (1991) to whom we refer for more discussion and an excellent account of the history of 
the entropy concept. Usually, statistical entropy is referred to simply as entropy; the term Shannon’s 
entropy is also used. 
12 For a more detailed account of the properties of statistical property see, among others, Balian (1991), 
Khinchin (1957), or Kapur and Kesavan (1992).   6 
Turn next to the  additivity properties  of statistical entropy  [Balian (1991),  Kapur and Kesavan 
(1992),  Khinchin (1957), Wannier (1987)]. To articulate these properties, consider two systems A 
and B with respective spaces of micro-states 
a G and
b G ; and let L and M be the respective numbers 
of micro-states, where L and M are positive integers. The corresponding probability assignments are 
designated by ) , , ( : 1
a
L
a a p p p L =  and ) , , ( : 1
b
M
b b p p p L = , where 
i i p D ˛  for . ,b a i =  
a D designates the 
L-1 dimensional unit simplex, while 
b D stands for the  M-1 dimensional unit simplex. Instead of 
separate experiments involving the individual systems, we may think of a joint experiment for the 
ensemble of A and B whose possible outcomes are pairs of micro-states of A and B. This composite 
system is denoted by AB; its space of micro-states is the Cartesian product 
b a G · G of 
a G and
b G . 
The associated joint probability distribution is denoted by 
 
                         ) , , ( : 11 LM
b a p p p p L = *                                                                                           (1.4) 
 
with lm p being the probability that A is in micro-state  l and B in micro-state  m 
). , , 1 ; , , 1 ( M m L l L L = =
b a p p * is a vector in the LM-1 dimensional unit simplex. The statistical 
entropy  ) (
b a p p H *  of the joint probability distribution 
b a p p * is given by 
 








b a p p k p p H ￿￿
= =
- = *                                                                              (1.5) 
  
Begin with a situation where A and B are statistically independent in the sense that 
 




l lm p p p ￿ =                                                                                                              (1.6)    
 
for  L l , , 1L =  and  . , , 1 M m L =  In turn, insert (1.6) into (1.5) and recall the definitions of  ) (
a p H  
and  ) (
b p H  along with the normalization conditions for 
a p  and 
b p  to obtain 
 
                       ), ( ) ( ) (
b a b a p H p H p p H + = *                                                                                  (1.7) 
 
which is referred to as the  additivity property of statistical entropy. Thus for two independent 
probability distributions, the statistical entropy of the joint probability distribution equals the sum of 
the statistical entropies of the individual distributions. It is easy to see that the additivity property 
holds for any finite number of independent probability distributions.   
 
If A and B are not statistically independent and hence (1.6) does not hold, the joint distribution 
b a p p * is the primary concept with the marginal distributions
a p  and 
b p  defined by 
 









:           ) , , 1 ( L l L =                                                                                 (1.8) 
and 
   7 









:          ), , , 1 ( M m L =                                                                             (1.9) 
 
respectively. To see how (1.7) gets modified under conditions of non-independence, observe that 
instead of (1.6) we have 
 








lm q  is the conditional probability that  the system B is in micro-state m given that A is in the 
lth micro-state
13. Substituting (1.10) for  lm p  in (1.5) we obtain 
 
                          . ln ln ) (
1 1 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= = = =





















b a q q p k q p p k p p H                                    (1.11)                
 








1 for any  ; , , 1 L l L =  further, we may regard                            








l q q k q H ln : ) (
1 ￿
=
￿ - =                                                                                       (1.12) 
 
as the statistical entropy of the conditional probability distribution  
 






l q q q L = ￿                                                                                                (1.13) 
 
of the micro-states of B when A is known to be in micro-state l. Hence (1.11) becomes    
                         








a b a q H p p H p p H ￿
= ￿ + = *                                                                   (1.14) 
 
which is known as the strong additivity property of statistical entropy. 
  
Using the convexity of the function  , ln x x x a one can show
14 that the second term in the right side 
of (1.14) cannot exceed  ) (
b p H  and hence (1.14) yields 
 
                          ), ( ) ( ) (
b a b a p H p H p p H + £ *                                                                             (1.15)  
 
the subadditivity property of statistical entropy. It states that when 
a p  and 
b p are not necessarily 
independent, the statistical entropy of the joint probability distribution is less than or equal to the 
                                                 
13 The conditional probability in (1.10) is defined only for  . 0 >
a
l p The  possibility that  0 =
a
l p for 
some l does not cause any problem because in such a case we would have  0 = lm p as well (for all m). 
14 See, for example, Kapur and Kesavan (1992).   8 
sum of the statistical entropies of the (marginal) probability distributions associated with the 
individual systems. To put it in another way, inequality (1.14) states that we lack less information 
about the composite system AB when we know the correlations between the micro-states of A and B 
than when we know the separate marginal probabilities of the micro-states of  each system [Balian 
(1991, p. 106)]. The generalization of (1.15) to any finite number of systems is straightforward. 
 
The properties derived from the expression (1.2) for statistical entropy are all desired features for a 
plausible measure of uncertainty or disorder
15. But we only need to posit some of these properties for 
a measure of uncertainty in order to show that it must of the form (1.2). Shannon (1948) was the first 
to derive such a result. We summarize here Khinchin’s (1957) version of this result, his uniqueness 
theorem. Return to our original system with a set  G of n micro-states and the associated space of 
probability distributions: the n-1 unit simplex  D as defined in (1.1). Let  ￿ ﬁ D : H  be a function 
which is defined and continuous for any positive integer  n and, in addition, has the following 
properties: a) for given n, the uniform probability distribution  ) / 1 , , / 1 ( n n L  maximizes  H over  ; D  
b)  H satisfies the strong additivity property as in (1.14); and c) Adding an impossible micro-state or 
any number of impossible micro-states does not change the value of H, that is  
 
                        ). , , ( ) 0 , , , ( 1 1 n n p p H p p H L L =                                                                            (1.16)                         
 
Then, Khinchin has shown, H must be of the form (1.2), which is the expression for statistical 
entropy. 
 
The method of deriving the probability distribution ) , , ( : 1 n p p p L = , i.e. the system’s macro-state, on 
the basis of macroscopic data was principally established
16 by Jaynes (1957), which he termed ‘the 
principle of maximum entropy’. Following Balian (1991), we shall call it the maximum statistical 
entropy principle. It stipulates that amongst all probability distributions that are compatible with the 
available data we must choose the most disordered macro-state, namely the probability distribution 
that has the greatest statistical entropy. Any other choice of macro-state, the argument goes, would 
entail an arbitrary attribution of order for which there is no foundation.  
 
It is important to distinguish two different types of available information. One type consists of data 
given with certainty. This kind of information is taken into account by appropriately restricting the 
space Gof allowable micro-states. If this is the only information we have, the maximum statistical  
entropy  principle coincides with the PIR:  it  entails that  the system’s macro-state should be a 
uniform probability distribution. Things change, though, if there is information in the form of data of 
a statistical nature: if the expected values of some macroscopic variables are predetermined. Suppose 
there are m macro-variables, real-valued functions of the micro-state  , , , 1 , , , 1 , m r n i g i ri L L a = =  
where m is a positive integer less than n-1, whose expectation values are given. Then we have m 
constraints of the form  , , , 1 ,
1
m r g p r ri
n
i
i L = = ￿
=
x  where  m x x , , 1 L  are known real constants. The 
maximum statistical entropy principle amounts to the following constrained maximization problem:  
                                                 
15 To avoid confusion with the notion of uncertainty in economics, we will predominantly refer to statistical 
entropy as a measure of disorder from now on. Besides the term disorder is overwhelmingly used in 
statistical thermodynamics, and is more intuitively appealing for our purposes. 
16 For other scholars who independently contributed to the method see Kapur and Kesavan (1992, p. 36).   9 
 
Choose p to 
 





i p p ￿
=
-                                                                                                   (1.17)     
subject to 
 






i p                                                                                                                 (1.18) 
 





ig p x = ￿
=
         , , , 1 m r L =                                                                              (1.19) 
                                                                                                                                          
                          , 0 ‡ i p                      . , , 1 n i L =                                                                              (1.20)   
  
Note that the constant k in the expression (1.2) for statistical entropy has been normalized to one—a 
practice to be followed hereafter. We will also find it convenient to write separately the 
normalization requirement (1.18) and the non-negativity condition (1.20) for  p instead of the 
compact statement  ; D ˛ p  it turns out [Kapur and Kesavan (1992)] that inequalities (1.20) will be 
automatically satisfied. 
      
Rather than examining the constrained maximization problem  (1.17)—(1.20) in general terms, we 
turn to the study of problems of this sort in the context of a statistical mechanical model of pure 
exchange, inspired by the statistical equilibrium theory of markets of Foley (1994, 1996a,b, 2003). 
 
 
2. A Statistical Mechanical Model of Pure Exchange    
 
In this and the following section we develop a statistical mechanical model of pure exchange that 
draws more specifically upon  Foley (1994,  2003).  We begin with the specification of a pure 
exchange economy in an Arrow-Debreu fashion [Debreu (1998)]. Thus we posit a world of L distinct 
goods or useful (desirable) entities referred to as resources,  inhabited by  N individual  agents or 
traders. Note that we prefer to use the neutral (and broader) term ‘resource’ a la Rozonoer (1973) 
instead of the standard Arrow-Debreu ‘commodity’. All activities or endowments are ordered L-lists 
of quantities of resources or points in the resource space  .
L ￿  Resources are typically indexed 
by L l , , 1L = , while agents are indexed by  ; , , 1 N L = n   L and  N are positive integers. The 
consumption or use of the lth resource  ) , , 1 ( L l L =  by the n th agent  ) , , 1 ( N L = n  is a nonnegative 
real number  ; 0 ‡
n s l   and the agent’s consumption  activity  or  action is the 
vector
L
L + ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1
n n n s s s L , with 
L
+ ￿  being  her consumption set. It is assumed that all agents 
have the same consumption set
L
+ ￿ .  
   10 
Every agent  { } N , , 1L ˛ n  is characterized by the pair  ) , ( n
n f e  of the endowment 
L e + ￿ ˛
n  and of the 
preference relation   n f  on  ,
L
+ ￿ where  f stands for ‘at least as good as’ or weak preference; the 
agent’s willingness to trade as she enters the market may be represented by her preferred action set 
n G : the set of actions or resource bundles in 
L




                              { }
n n n n s s e
L f + ￿ ˛ = G : .                                                                                      (2.1) 
 
Any point in the preferred action set represents a potential trading activity. The endowment of each 
agent is by definition an element of her preferred action set—inaction or no trade is always a 
possible action. 
 
The data of a pure exchange economy E with L resources and N agents are summarized by the array 
 
                             . ) , ( : , , 1 N e L f = = E n n
n                                                                                               (2.2)                             
 
It is assumed that the total endowment of the economyE, defined by 
 








n ,                                                                                                             (2.3) 
 
is strictly positive in all its components, that is,  .
L e + + ￿ ˛  Even though we could allow for individual 
endowment vectors with some or all components equal to zero, we will assume that 
L e + + ￿ ˛
n  for all 
individuals  { } N , , 1L ˛ n  for the sake of simplicity. The total endowment coincides with the total 
supply of  E if the latter is an isolated economy. Aside from the standard properties of reflexivity, 
totality (or completeness), and transitivity, we will make no other assumption regarding the 
preference relation. In particular, we do  not require  that the preferred action sets as in (2.1) be 
convex.  In fact,  pretty much as in Foley (1994),  we will make the simplifying assumption 
that { } N , , 1L ˛ "n , 
n G  is a large but finite subset of .
L
+ + ￿  
 
To motivate the probabilistic considerations of the model, we will make the additional assumption 
[after Foley (1994)] that the set of agents is partitioned into I equivalence classes or types according 
to a predetermined rule { } I i , , 1 ) ( L a ˛ n n , where I is a known positive integer
18. Agents of the 
same type have the same preferred action set. Thus in effect there are only I distinct preferred action 
sets, indexed by  . , , 1 I i L =  The preferred action set of agent n  is 
) (n i G , while 
i G designates the 
common preferred action set of all agents of type i, that is, of all agents n  for whom  . ) ( i i = n There 
                                                 
17 The preferred action set corresponds to Foley’s concept of a transaction or offer set. But where Foley 
(1994, 2003) defines the latter in terms of net demands or transactions, our definition is in terms of agent   
actions or gross demands. Further, unlike Foley, our preferred action set is a derived concept rather than a 
primitive of the theory.  
18 As shown in Section 5, this assumption is not essential for the validity of the statistical mechanical 
model.   11 
are i N  agents of type i,  , , , 1 I i L =  where  I N N , , 1 L  are pre-specified large positive integers, which 
sum up to the total number of agents, i.e. 
 
                           . 1 N N N I = + +L                                                                                                   (2.4)                                                                                  
 
For concreteness, we may presume that agents of type 1 are labeled by 1 , , 1 N L  , agents of type 2 are 
labeled by  , , , 1 2 1 1 N N N + + L  and so forth.  A complete specification of the state of the economy or 
a micro-state s
r
  is an ordered list of agent actions:  
 
                        ). , , , , , , , ( :
2 1 1 1 1 1 N N N N N s s s s s s L L L
r + + =                                                              (2.5)                                 
 
This concept of a micro-state corresponds to Foley’s definition of a “market allocation.” Not every 
vector 
LN
+ ￿ ˛ s
r
 is a possible micro-state: no individual agent will engage in activities outside her 
preferred action set. Accordingly, a micro-state as in (2.5) is possible if  { }, , , 1
) ( N
i L ˛ " G ˛ n s
n n   
namely if   
 
                      . ) ( ) ( :
1 1 I N I N G · · G = G ˛ L
r
s                                                                                       (2.6)         
 
Here 
i N i) (G  is the  fold Ni -  Cartesian product of  
i G    ) , , 1 ( I i L = . Thus Gas given in (2.6) is the 
space of all possible micro-states for our exchange economyE. A microscopically possible micro-
state  G ˛ =
+ + ) , , , , , , , ( :
2 1 1 1 1 1 N N N N N s s s s s s L L L
r
  is globally feasible  if it satisfies the market- 
clearing condition  
 






n s                                                                                                                      (2.7) 
 
Clearly, there are a very large number of globally feasible micro-states. In the Arrow-Debreu model, 
agents are faced with a vector of resource (commodity) prices (cried out by the Walrasian 
auctioneer); they choose the action that is highest in their preference scale, subject to the budget 
constraint that the value of the selected action cannot exceed the value of their endowment. Under 
appropriate conditions, individual actions or gross demands are determined as functions of the price 
vector. So does the total demand on the left-hand side of (2.7). The price vector is determined by the 
latter (up to a multiplicative constant). This entails in turn the determination of all individual actions 
(given that they are homogeneous of degree zero in prices). 
 
The Arrow-Debreu method of removing indeterminacy leaves completely open the question of how 
a price system comes to form in the first place. The virtue of the statistical mechanical approach is 
that the emergence of prices is the hallmark of equilibrium [Foley (2003)]. In this approach, the 
indeterminacy of the economy’s micro-state is dealt with in a fundamentally different fashion. In the 
absence of information about trading practices at the micro level, it is posited that all globally 
feasible micro-states are equally probable. The market is considered in the words of Foley (2003, 
p.102) as “a chaotic process that tends to explore all feasible patterns of market transactions.” The 
objective of the theory is no longer the prediction of the action of each individual agent; rather, we   12 
want to find out how the agents of every type are distributed over their preferred action sets. The 
equal-probability premise entails that the agent distribution that is most likely to obtain is the one 
that gets realized in the greatest number of microscopic ways. This is tantamount—as we shall see 
shortly—to positing a probability distribution on  G  whose statistical entropy gets maximized, 
subject to the market-clearing condition (2.7)
19. The latter will be interpreted as a statistical datum—
namely, as knowledge of  the  mean total action or demand (with respect to the probability 
distribution under determination).  
 
Assume  that individual actions are  statistically independent:  the probability  ) (s
r
p of a market 
allocation  G ˛ s
r
 equals the product of the probabilities of the individual actions that constitute that 
allocation. Thus we only need to know the probability  ) (s
i p  that an agent of type i takes action s    
for all 
i G ˛ s and for all  } { I i , , 1L ˛  in order to ascertain the probability of any micro-state. That is, 
the probability of the micro-states
r
 as in (2.5)—which is the economy’s macro-state—is given by  
 
                    ). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 N I N N N N p p p p p p s s s s s s L L L
r + + ￿ =                                  (2.8) 
 
The macro-state  G ˛ s s r r
)] ( [p  is in effect specified by a list  { } I i p i
i , , 1 )] ( [ L =
G ˛ w w  of I probability 
vectors;  we s hall often summarize the latter by ), , , ( :
1 I p p p L =   where 
{ } . , , 1 , )] ( [ : I i p p i
i i L ˛ =




p  is then 
determined via (2.8), we shall often use the same symbol to summarize the latter as well.  The 
probabilities of individual actions should be nonnegative and satisfy the normalization conditions 
                                                                                                                                                              





i p       . , , 1 I i L =                                                                                          (2.9) 
 
For large i N  , the number of agents of type i that take action 
i G ˛ w  is approximately equal to 
) (w
i











p N  since  ,









n s s the market-clearing condition 
(2.7) becomes   
 











                                                                                                  (2.10)       
 
The left side of (2.10) is the  mean or  expected value of aggregate action or total demand 
N N N N N s s s s s + + + + + + +
+ + L L L
2 1 1 1 1 1 with  respect  to  the  probability d istribution              
G ˛ s s r r
)) ( (p as in (2.8); thus the market-clearing condition in the form of (2.10) is tantamount to pre-
specifying the mean aggregate action in the spirit of (1.19).The only data we have about this 
unknown probability distribution (besides the requirement of non-negativity) are the constraints (2.9) 
                                                 
19 We are in effect referring here to the ‘method of the most probable distribution’ of statistical physics, 
originally developed by L. Boltzman in 1871 and articulated in the classic little book of Schrodinger 
(1952).See also McQuarrie (2000, Ch. 2) for  a brief but very clear account of this method.   13 
and (2.10).  Given the statistical independence of individual actions,  the additivity property  of 
statistical entropy allows us to write the statistical entropy  ) (p H of p as follows:  
 







i p p N p H
i ￿ ￿
G ˛ =
- =                                                                              (2.11)  
 
Before taking up the constraint maximization of (2.11), we briefly illustrate the connection between 
statistical entropy and degree of disorder
20. Since the number of agents of type i,  , i N is assumed to 
be large (for any  I i , , 1L = ),the probabilities of individual actions may be interpreted (as already 
alluded to) as relative frequencies: ) (w
i p is approximately equal to the proportion of agents of type i 
that take action 
i G ˛ w ; and  ) (w
i
ip N  is then the  occupation number of w , namely  the  number of 
those agents that take actionw . The number  ) (
i
i p W  of different ways (i.e. agent assignments to 
actions) that may result in the occupation numbers  i
i
ip N
G ˛ w w)] ( [  is given by 
 





i p N N p W
i ￿
G ˛
=        . , , 1 I i L =                                                              (2.12)  
 
 Accordingly, a certain probability distribution or macro-state p can materialize in 
 





i p W p W ￿
=
=                                                                                                         (2.13) 
 





i p W p W ￿
=
=  by  (2.12) and Sterling’s approximation for large 






i i p p N p W
i ￿
G
- @  accordingly, (2.11) yields  
 
                    ). ( ln ) ( p W p H =                                                                                                          (2.14) 
 
Thus the statistical entropy  ) (p H  of a probability distribution p is a strictly increasing function of 
the number of ways  ) (p W  in which the occupation numbers , , , 1 , )] ( [ I i p N i
i
i L =
G ˛ w w  can be 
realized.  
 
The concept of statistical entropy and the principle of its maximization do not require ‘repeated 
experiments’ and the prevalent frequency interpretation of probability [Jaynes (2003)]. But in the 
statistical equilibrium setting of a pure exchange economy (as in basic statistical thermodynamics) a 
macro-state or probability distribution p is often  naturally associated with relative frequencies and 
occupation numbers. As a consequence, statistical entropy—which  in the Shannon tradition is a 
measure of uncertainty or  missing information—can also be interpreted by means of (2.14) as an 
objective measure of disorder.  The constrained maximization of statistical entropy amounts to 
                                                 
20 See Foley (1994) and Footnote 19.   14 
selecting the most disordered of the feasible macro-states—the macro-state that can be realized in 
the greatest number of ways and hence the most likely to materialize. 
 
 
3. Statistical Equilibrium Prices  
 
The  statistical equilibrium for the economy  E  is the probability distribution  with the highest 
statistical entropy under the constraint of the market-clearing condition.  That is, a statistical 
equilibrium is a collection  ) , , ( :
1 I p p p L = of nonnegative vectors that maximizes (2.11) subject to 
(2.9) and (2.10). The objective of this section is to address the questions of existence, uniqueness, 
and characterization of such equilibrium
21. As with any constrained-optimization problem, we begin 
with the properties of its objective function and constraint set. 
 
Regarding the objective function, we need to recall  the discussion of statistical entropy in Section 1: 
letting the positive integer  i g   be the cardinality of the preferred action set 
i G  and
i D   be the 
associated  1 - i g   dimensional unit  simplex, we infer from that discussion that 
) ( ln ) ( w w
w
i i i p p p
i ￿
G ˛
- a  is continuous and strictly concave on 
i D   ). , , 1 ( I i L =   Given that 
I N N , , 1 L  are all positive integers,  it follows that the statistical entropy  (2.11) is continuous and 
strictly concave on  . :
1 I D · · D = D L   
 
The  constraint set i s defined as the collection of nonnegative  vectors ) , , ( :
1 I p p p L = , 
{ }, , , 1 , I i p
i i L ˛ ￿ ˛ +
g which satisfy (2.9) and (2.10). It is useful for our purposes to embed this set 
into a family of constraint sets by replacing the total endowment e in (2.10) by an arbitrary total 
supply 
L
L + ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1 x x x L  to yield 
 









i p N                                                                                                  (3.1) 
 
Associated with (3.1) is the constraint set ] [x C  defined by  
 














p N p C
w
x w w x                                                                        (3.2)                                    
 
We are thus led to the study of a parametric family of maximization problems  
 
                                                 
21The term ‘statistical equilibrium’ is due to Foley (1994), who  has fully worked out the existence, 
uniqueness and characterization of statistical equilibrium  in  his model. His analysis certainly carries over 
to the version of the statistical mechanical model advanced here.  The development of our arguments 
regarding these issues, though, takes a somewhat different, constructivist route, given our emphasis in 
establishing the properties of the maximized statistical entropy as a function of the total amounts of 
resources.   15 
                      { }, ] [ ) ( max x C p p H ˛                                                                                                   (3.3) 
                    
indexed by the points x  in some subset of  .
L
+ ￿  
 
The notation in (3.1)-(3.3) intends to signify that one may vary the total supply of resources while 
holding agent endowments constant. Aside from being analytically useful, the discrepancy between 
total supply and total endowment will acquire operational significance when our economy  E is 
opened up to trade with another economy. But as long as we consider an isolated economy with total 
endowment e, the pertinent statistical equilibrium is the solution to (3.3) when . e = x  














e p N p e C
1
) ( : ] [
w
w w  is the constraint set 
of the isolated economyE, namely the collection of the nonnegative probability vectors that satisfy 
(2.9) and (2.10). The set  ] [e C  is non-empty. This follows from the fact that a micro-state s
r
 as in 
(2.6) with  { } N e , , 1L ˛ " = n s
n n  (i.e. a micro-state in which the action of every agent is to stick 
with her initial endowment) is microscopically possible [that is, condition (2.6) is fulfilled] and 
globally feasible [on account of (2.3) and (2.7)]. Further, it is easy to show that  ] [e C  is compact and 
convex. . From the continuity of statistical entropy and the fact that the constrained set ] [e C is non-
empty and compact we infer by means of the Weierstrass theorem
22 that the problem (3.3) when 
e = x  has a solution; in addition, since the constraint set ] [e C  is convex and H is strictly concave, 
the solution is unique
23; the unique solution  is designated  
 
                  { } . ] [ ) ( max arg : ) ( e C p p H e p ˛ =                                                                                     (3.4)  
 
We will soon establish that under plausible restrictions there is an open set 
L U + + ￿ ˝  containing the 
total endowment e such that for every  U ˛ x the set  ] [x C  is non-empty. It is easy to show that  ] [x C  
is, in addition, compact and convex
L
+ ￿ ˛ "x . Hence the constraint set (3.2) is non-empty, compact, 
and convex for every  , U ˛ x for some open set 
L U + + ￿ ˝  containing the economy’s total endowment 
e. The arguments that led to (3.4) apply to the problem (3.3) for every  . U ˛ x Accordingly, the 
solution to (3.3) 
 
                  { } ] [ ) ( max arg : ) ( x x C p p H p ˛ =                                                                                     (3.5)  
 
and the maximized statistical entropy 
 
                  { }, ] [ ) ( max : ) ( x x C p p H S ˛ =                                                                                          (3.6)                                       
 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Moore (1999, Theorem 3.26). 
23 See, for example, Sundaram (1996, Theorem 7.13).   16 
are well defined for every total supply  . U ˛ x The maximum value function  ￿ ﬁ U S :  defined by 
(3.6) corresponds to the entropy concept of classical thermodynamics; it will be referred to as the 
entropy function of the economy and will play a central role in the sequel.  
 
Regarding the characterization of (3.5), recall from our general discussion Section 1 that (by the 
nature of  the  functional  form (2.11) for statistical entropy) the non-negativity constraint on the 
unknown probability distribution is not binding at the maximum. The maximization problem (3.3) 
boils down to finding a positive-valued probability distribution that maximizes (2.11) subject to the 
linear constraints (2.9) and (3.1). The Lagrange multiplier theorem (for maximization problems with 
equality constraints) becomes relevant
24. To ensure its applicability to the problem at hand, we only 







: g g of the cardinalities of the preferred action sets is greater 
than the total number I+L of constraints in (2.9) and (3.1),  L I + > g —an  essential presupposition 
for the applicability of the maximum statistical entropy principle; and b) that the I+L of constraints  
in (2.9) and (3.1) satisfy the  non-degenerate constraint qualification (NDCQ), namely  that  the 
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i p N p N p p N p    (3.7) 
 
be Lagrangean function for the problem of maximizing (2.11) subject to (2.9) and (3.1), with               
I
I ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1 m m m L   and 
L
L ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1 p p p L   being  vectors of Lagrange multipliers
25.  The 
Lagrange multiplier theorem entails that if  ) (x p p =  is the solution (3.5) with 
g
+ + ￿ ˛ p  [which is 
tantamount to saying that 
g
+ + ￿ ˛ p  is a maximizer of (2.11) subject to (2.9) and (3.1)], then there 
exist unique vectors of Lagrange multipliers, 
I ￿ ˛ m  and  ,
L ￿ ˛ p such that the Lagrangean function 
(3.7) has a critical point at ) (x p p = , i.e.  
 
                     , 0 ) ( / = ¶ L ¶ w
i p    { } . , , 1 , I i
i L ˛ G ˛ w                                                                           (3.8) 
 
Since the first term of the Lagrangean function (3.7) is strictly concave while the other two terms are 
linear in the unknown probability distribution, the Lagrangean function is concave irrespective of the 
signs of the multipliers. Accordingly, the first-order (necessary) conditions (3.8) along with (2.9) and 
(3.1) are also sufficient
26 for a positive-valued solution to the parametric  maximization problem 
(3.3). To put it more succinctly, the triple  ) , , ( p m p  just defined is characterized by equations (2.9), 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Simon and Blume (1994, Theorem 18.2) or Sydsaeter (1981, Theorem 5.20). 
25 The writing of the multiplier for the ith constraint in (2.9) as  ) 1 ( - i i N m  is just a matter of 
convenience. 
26 See, for example, Carter (2001, Corollary 5.2.4) or Sydsaeter (1981, Theorem 5.21).    17 
(3.1), and (3.8). The properties of statistical equilibrium distributions and associated multipliers are 
embodied in the latter system of equations. We, therefore, now turn to the study of that system.   
 
In view of (3.7), equation (3.8) yields   w p m w ￿ - - = i
i p ) ( ln  and hence 
                                                                     
                   ), exp( ) exp( ) ( w p m w ￿ - - = i
i p     { }. , , 1 , I i
i L ˛ G ˛ w                                                     (3.9)   
 
Insert (3.9) into (2.9) to obtain 
 
                   ), ( / ] exp[ ) ( p w p w
i i Z p ￿ - = , , , 1 , I i
i L = G ˛ w                                                        (3.10)      
 
and  ) ( exp p m
i
i Z =  or 
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i










w p p ] exp[ : ) (                                                                                                (3.12)  
 
is a normalization factor, known as the partition function  for agents of type  i   ). , , 1 ( I i L =  The 
statistical equilibrium distribution (3.10) is known in statistical thermodynamics as the canonical or 
Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution.  The dependence of  ) (w
i p  [in (3.10)] on x  is suppressed; it should 
be clear from the context from this point on that  ) (x p p =  whenever p refers to the equilibrium 
probability  distribution.  The vector  ) , , ( : 1 L p p p L =  is  determined  by the requirement that the 
market-clearing condition (3.1) be satisfied; insert (3.10) into (3.1) to obtain the determining system 
of equations in  : p  
 
                  . )] ( / ) [exp(
1
x w p w p
w







                                                                            (3.13)             
 
Following Foley (1994), we call  l p  the  entropy price of the  lth resource  ), , , 1 ( L l L =  and  
) , , ( : 1 L p p p L =  the entropy price vector; we will also refer to p  as the statistical equilibrium price 
vector.  The left-hand side of (3.11) is the mean total action or gross demand of the economy 
expressed as a function of entropy prices, which may be seen as adjusting to balance total demand to 
the total supply. But the entropy prices here clear the market by appropriately distributing agents 
over their preferred action sets, rather than by coordinating their utility-maximizing choices (as in 
the Arrow-Debreu model). We need to recall that when our economy  E is isolated, the total supply 
x  is equal to the total endowment e, the actually given total supply of  . E Accordingly, the statistical 
equilibrium price vector  ) , , ( : 1
* * * = L p p p L for  E obtains when e = x , and the associated canonical 
distribution is specified by setting 
* =p p  in (3.10) and (3.12). The statistical equilibrium with 
e „ x becomes relevant when the given exchange economy  E interacts with other economies.    18 
 
Whether the economy  E is isolated or open, the emergence of entropy prices as determined by 
(3.13) and the corresponding canonical distribution in (3.10) signal the attainment of statistical 
equilibrium in  E—that the economy has reached its most disordered macro-state, given the total 
supply  .
L U + + ￿ ˝ ˛ x  The significance of such  an equilibrium concept stems from the economic 
assumption  that underlies the statistical mechanical  perspective—that the spontaneous trading 
practices among individual agents drive the economy to its most disordered macro-state, compatible 
with the available resources. It is important to reiterate that in the statistical equilibrium approach, 
unlike the Arrow-Debreu model, we do not begin with a price vector to which individual agents 
react; rather agents come to the market with their preferred action sets and try to strike deals to their 
best advantage. As a consequence of repeated (possibly multilateral) exchanges the most disordered 
macro-state eventually sets in, with entropy prices emerging as the social outcome of these 
interactions at the micro-level. The statistical equilibrium price vector p  serves to define the entropy 
cost  w p ￿  of any individual action  w  and a scalar probability field,  ), exp( w p w ￿ - a applicable to 
all agents and thus signifying that all participate in the same market
27. Actions of higher entropy cost 
are less likely to materialize, though the likelihood varies with the type of agents—different 
preferred action sets entail different partition functions. 
 
 We now turn to the question of existence of an open  set [containing the total endowment e] on 
which the constraint set (3.2) is non-empty and to the study of the properties of the entropy function. 
It turns out that the system (3.13) plays a pivotal role in deciding the answers to these questions. To 
facilitate the understanding of (3.13), focus on the transformation 
L L T ￿ ﬁ ￿ :  defined by the left-
hand side of (3.13), namely 
                  
                  ). ] ) ( / ) [exp( ( : ) (
1








i Z N T                                                                    (3.14) 
 
We may view  T as a vector-valued function or an ordered  L-list  ) , , ( : 1 L T T T L = of real-valued 
functions, with the lth component function  ￿ ﬁ ￿
L
l T :  being defined by                    
                  { } . , , 1 ), ] ) ( / ) [exp( ( : ) (
1






L ˛ " ￿ - = ￿ ￿
G ˛ =
w p w p p
w
                                          (3.15) 
 
We first note that the transformation  T is infinitely continuously differentiable or of class 
¥ C everywhere in its domain; to put it otherwise, each of the component functions  L T T , , 1 L  of the 
transformation is of class 
k C  or k times continuously differentiable to any desired order k. That T is 
of class 
1 C  is all that we will need in the sequel. By differentiating every component function (3.15) 
with respect to each entropy price, we infer that the Jacobian matrix (or Jacobian derivative) 
L L
m l T DT
· ¶ ¶ = )] )( / [( : ) ( p p p  of T at 
L ￿ ˛ p is given by  
            
                                                 
27 Our interpretation of statistical equilibrium and entropy prices draws on the work of Foley, especially on 
Foley (2003).   19 






i N DT S - = ￿
=
                                                                                        (3.16)  
 
where  ) (p
i S  is the variance-covariance matrix of  the random vector { }, , , 1 , I i
i L ˛ G ˛ w relative to 
the normal distribution (3.10).   
 
For any given entropy price vector 
L ￿ ˛ p , we know that the variance-covariance matrix  ) (p
i S has 
to be non-negative definite
28  { }; , , 1 I i L ˛ "  barring degenerate situations, namely supposing that 
each of these variance-covariance matrices is positive-definite, it follows from (3.16) that the 
Jacobian matrix   ) (p DT  of T  is negative-definite and hence non-singular  . p " As a consequence, 
the image  ) (
L T ￿  of  
L ￿  is  an open set
29; by inspection of  (3.12) and (3.14),  . ) (
L L T + + ￿ ˝ ￿  It also 
follows that T has 
1 C  local inverse everywhere in its domain
30, although it need not have a single 
inverse defined on the entire image set  ). (
L T ￿  Thus for any given entropy price vector p  there is 
an open neighborhood  ) ( ) (
L T B ￿ ˝ p of  p on which T is invertible; letting  ) ( : p p B T T = be the 
restriction of T on  ), (p B the Jacobian matrix  )) ( (
1 p p T DT
-  of its inverse 
1 -
p T  is given by 
 
                    ; )) ( ( )) ( (
1 1 - - = p p p p DT T DT                                                                                         (3.17) 
 
Actually, we can go beyond this local-inverse result by integrating our existence/uniqueness and 
characterization analysis. We have already established that the maximization problem (3.3) has a 
unique solution    
 
                    { } ] [ ) ( max arg : ) ( e C p p H e p ˛ =                                                                                  (3.18) 
 
when  e = x . By the Lagrange multiplier theorem, there is a unique vector 
L ￿ ˛
* p  of multipliers 
[associated with the market-clearing condition (2.10) or (3.13) with e = x ] such that the pertinent 
first-order conditions are satisfied; thus (2.10) or (3.13) with e = x is satisfied and hence, by  (3.14), 
e T =
*) (p , entailing that . ) (
L L T e + + ￿ ˝ ￿ ˛  In sum, we have shown that the image set  ) (
L T ￿  is an 
open set in 
L
+ + ￿  and contains the total endowment vector of the exchange economy  . E                                                                                                                                                                                  
                   
Whenx  is not restricted to be equal to the total endowment e, we first note that for any given total 
supply  ), (
L T ￿ ˛ x  there is 
L ￿ ˛ p such that  x p = ) ( T  [by the very definition of the image 
set ) (
L T ￿ ]. This means that the associated positive vector of probabilities (3.10) satisfies (2.9) and 
(3.1) and hence it is an element of the constraint set (3.2). Accordingly, there is indeed an open set 
 
                    
L L T U + + ￿ ˝ ￿ = ) ( :                                                                                                      (3.19) 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Searle and Willett (2001, p. 79).  
29 See, for example, Buck (1978, p. 356: Theorem 15). 
30 Here we invoke the inverse function theorem—see, for example, Carter (2001, Theorem 4.4) or 
Sydsaeter (1981, Theorem 3.8).   20 
 
containing the total endowment  such that the constraint set (3.2) is non-empty  U ˛ "x ; the unique 
solution (3.5) and the corresponding entropy function (3.6) are well-defined on (3.19) as anticipated. 
 
Since for any given total supply x in (3.19), the maximization problem (3.3) has a unique solution 
, ) (
g x + + ￿ ˛ p  the Lagrange multiplier theorem once again entails that there is a unique 
L ￿ ˛ p such 
that  x p = ) ( T . Accordingly, the transformation 
L L T ￿ ﬁ ￿ : is globally 1-to-1 in 
L ￿ and hence 
there is an inverse transformation 
1 - T  defined on the open set (3.19). On account of the fact that T is 
of class 
1 C  with non-singular Jacobian matrix everywhere in its domain, it follows
31 that 
1 - T is of 
class 
1 C on
L L T U + + ￿ ˝ ￿ = ) ( : , and its Jacodian matrix is given by 
 
                    , )) ( ( ) (
1 1 - - = p x DT DT                                                                                                 (3.20) 
 
where  ) (p x T =  or, equivalently,  
 
                    ), (
1 x p
- =T   . U ˛ x                                                                                                      (3.21) 
 
It immediately follows that the entropy function S is of class 
1 C  on the open set 
L U + + ￿ ˝   given by 
(3.19); indeed, insert  ) (w
i p  from (3.10) into (2.11) and take into account (3.13) to derive    
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1




i Z N S ￿
=
+ ￿ =                                                                                        (3.22)                        
   
which is a 
1 C  function on account of the fact that  p  is 
1 C  vector-valued function of  , x given by 
(3.21).  Hence the familiar envelope result 
 
                  ), (x p S ￿ =    , U ˛ x                                                                                                       (3.23) 
 
 
 holds true. But (3.21) is of class 
1 C  and hence, by (3.23), the entropy function S is of class  .
2 C  
Moreover, from (3.20), (3.21), and (3.23) we have 
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1 2 x x




lm S S D
· = )] ( [ : ) (
" 2 x x is the Hessian matrix of S at , x summarizing the second-order partial 
derivatives of S at  . x  Since the Jacobian matrix   ) (p DT  of T is negative-definite   , p "  the Jacobian 
matrix  ) (
1 x
- DT  of the inverse transformation 
1 - T , given by (3.20)-(3.21), is also negative definite 
. U ˛ "x  It follows from (3.24) that the Hessian matrix of the second-order partial derivatives of S is 
                                                 
31 See Buck (1978, p. 358: Theorem 16). This result is also known as the inverse function rule—for a 
weaker version of this rule, see, for example, Carter (1999, Exercise 4.27).   21 
negative-definite ) ( U ˛ "x , entailing that S is a regular strictly concave function. The designation of 
S as a regular strictly concave function (not a standard term) intends to signify (and underscore) that 
the Hessian matrix of the entropy function is negative-definite everywhere in its domain.  
 
With  finite preferred  action  sets, it is expected that the domain  of  S  is bounded above—no 
sufficiently large individual actions are possible so as to fulfill the market-clearing condition (3.13) 
for positive total supply vectors of arbitrarily large norm. Only when the preferred action sets are 
(denumerable or non-denumerable)  unbounded  sets (so that arbitrarily ‘large’ actions are 
individually possible as in the Arrow-Debreu world), is the constraint set (3.2) expected to remain 
non-empty for arbitrarily large total supplies of resources. But even under those conditions there 
may be restrictions on U ‘from below’, stemming from the fact that every preferred action set is 
typically restricted from below by the indifference set associated with the agent’s endowment. We 
surmise—in anticipation of the extendibility of the statistical mechanical model to the case where the 
preferred action sets are infinite and unbounded—that the domain of S is of the form 
 
                 { } L l a U l l
L , , 1 , : L = +¥ < < ￿ ˛ = + + x x                                                                          (3.25) 
 
for some  . ) , , ( : 1
L
L a a a + ￿ ˛ = L  Further, it is rather innocuous to presume that there is a continuous 
extension of S defined on the closure  { } L l a U l l
L , , 1 , : L = +¥ < £ ￿ ˛ = + + x x  of (3.25), even though 
this not a an inference of the statistical mechanical model. We shall henceforth pretend that 
L U + ￿ =  
without loss of generality. For if the vector of constants in (3.25) has some positive components, we 
can always   introduce new variables z  by the transformation  z x + = a  so that  U ˛ x   if and only 
if .
L
+ ￿ ˛ z  This change of variables would be tantamount to measuring the total supply of resources 
by its excess  a - x  over the constant vector a.  
 
In sum, we may take for granted from now on that the entropy function of the economy, defined by 
(3.6), is continuous on 
L
+ ￿  and, in addition, of class 
2 C and regular strictly concave on  .
L
+ + ￿ Strictly 
speaking , only the last two properties (of class 
2 C and regular strictly concave on  )
L
+ + ￿  have been 
rigorously deduced from the statistical mechanical model; the existence of a continuous extension of 
the entropy function with domain 
L
+ ￿  has been added as a harmless premise.  
 
 
4. Connection with Classical Thermodynamics  
 
As already indicated in Section 0, the Laws of classical thermodynamics are obtained as theorems in 
statistical thermodynamics, which, in addition, provides the means to calculate physical properties 
(as opposed to thermodynamics which provides only relations  between many properties).  In a 
parallel fashion, we seek to derive a phenomenological theory
32 of pure exchange from the statistical 
mechanical theory of markets.  Such a derivation is essential for ensuring the internal coherence of 
the statistical mechanical model of pure exchange; at the same time it will deepen our understanding 
                                                 
32 We prefer to use the term ‘phenomenological’ [Rozonoer (1973)] rather than ‘macro’ to designate a 
theory of exchange of resources between macroscopic subsystems without a detailed microscopic 
description of the interactions among agents.   22 
of the statistical mechanical model itself and of the analytical significance of the entropy function. 
Moreover, it will become clear that Rozonoer’s analysis of  ‘systems with additive effects’ is 
naturally linked to the statistical mechanical theory of pure exchange. 
 
The concept of a ‘composite system’ made out, actually or notionally, of macroscopic ‘equilibrium 
subsystems’ plays a key role in thermodynamics [Callen (1985), Tisza (1977)] and the generalized 
thermodynamics of Rozonoer (1973). Accordingly, our starting point is to view the pure-exchange 
economy  Eas a composite system made out of I subsystems. Subsystem  iconsists of all agents of 
type   { }. , , 1 , I i i L ˛   
 
Begin with the situation where the subsystems are isolated: a pre-trade condition. Each subsystem  i 







n  of resources, where, recall, 
L e + + ￿ ˛
n  is the endowment of 
agent n  in that subsystem. In the language of thermodynamics, the no-trade situation is tantamount 
to having each subsystem enclosed by a wall that is impermeable to resource flows; constraints that 
prevent the flow of one or more resources are also known as internal constraints in thermodynamics 
[Callen (1985, p. 26)].  In an  L-resource world there are  L  different kinds of  walls or  internal 
constraints; the  lth wall or internal constraint is blocking the flow of the  lth resource, but permits 
the flow of all other resources  l m „   ). , , 1 , ( I m l L =  
 
 If some or all internal constraints are removed, i.e. if agents of different types are free to exchange 
resources, then  resources may be redistributed among the subsystems.  The objective of the 
phenomenological theory is to predict the ‘equilibrium allocation’ that would emerge as a result of 
this redistribution. An allocation among the I subsystems is by definition a vector 
               
                , ) , , ( :





i i x x x + ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1 L   is the vector of resources allocated to the  subsystem { }, , , 1 I i L ˛  with 
0 ‡
i
l x  being the amount of the  lth resource acquired by subsystem  i, namely by the group of  
agents of type i as a whole. Before taking up the question of equilibrium, we need to identify which 
allocations are feasible. When the economy is an isolated system, the total amount of each resource 
is predetermined: 
 
                . :
1 1 ) ( 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿






i e e e x
n n
n n                                                                                            (4.2)                    
 
In order to directly link the analysis to the statistical mechanical model of the preceding section, we 
will study the allocation problem for an arbitrary given total supply  ,
L
+ ￿ ˛ x  and get the solution 
corresponding to (4.2) by setting  . e = x  Thus (4.2) is replaced by the more general condition 
  






i x     .
L
+ ￿ ˛ x                                                                                                           (4.3) 
   23 
To put it otherwise, resources are not wasted and hence are conserved in the process of exchange. 
Thus (4.2) or (4.3) is a summary of the conservation laws of our pure-exchange economy. The set of 
feasible allocations ] [x F  consists of the allocations that satisfy the conservation laws: 
 












i LI x x F x x                                                                                             (4.4) 
 
By inspection of the objective function (2.11) and the linear constraints (2.9) and (3.1), it is rather 
natural to envision a two-stage optimization procedure for solving problem (3.3), i.e. for finding   the 
most disordered macro-state of the economy. This observation is at the hart of the argument linking 
the statistical  mechanical model to a phenomenological theory of resource allocation—whose key 
proposition is an equilibrium principle that selects the allocation in (4.4) that will eventually prevail 
when all internal constraints are removed.  
 
In Stage I, we find the most disordered macro-state  i
i i p p
G ˛ =
w w)] ( [ : in each subsystem  { } I i , , 1L ˛  
associated with an arbitrary allocation (4.1); in other words, we choose 
i i p
g
+ ￿ ˛  to 
 
                 )] ( ln ) ( max[ w w
w
i i
i p p N
i ￿
G ˛









i p                                                                                                                     (4.6) 
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i i






                                                                                                          (4.7) 
 
It is clear from constraint (4.7) that the assignment of an arbitrary allocation  ) , , ( :
1 I x x x L =   is 
tantamount to specifying the levels of mean action,  
 





i N x N x x N N x L = =                                                                         (4.8) 
 
in  the  ithsubsystem,  . , , 1 I i L =   The maximization problem (4.5) for each type of agents (or 
subsystem) involves  1 + L  constraints [equations (4.6) and (4.7)] for the unknown probability 
distribution that is associated with that type of agents. The two key assumptions made earlier need to 
be strengthened in order to handle Stage I, i.e. (4.5)-(4.7). First, since our finite preferred sets are 
simplifying approximations of infinite sets, we may comfortably presume that  1 + L  is less than the 
number i g  of the unknown probabilities  { } I i , , 1L ˛ "  and hence the maximum statistical entropy 
principle becomes  applicable to each subsystem of the economy
33. Second, we assume that the 
                                                 
33 The assumption  g < + I L is now a consequence of positing  i L g < +1  for all  I i , , 1L = and is no 
longer needed as a separate presupposition.   24 
constraints (4.6) and (4.7) satisfy the NDCQ
34. On account of these two assumptions and  the 
observation  that the non-negativity constraint is not binding  at the maximum, it follows that the 
Lagrange multiplier theorem is once again applicable; hence the problem of maximizing (4.5), a 
strictly concave objective function, subject to the linear constraints(4.6) and (4.7), has at most one 
solution for each
i x , which is characterized by the associated first-order conditions. By solving the 
latter with respect to the unknown probability vector ,
i p  it is easy to establish that the solution must 
be of the canonical form  
 
                 ), ( / ) exp( ) (
i i i i Z p p w p w ￿ - =   ; , , 1 , I i





i i ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1 p p p L  is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint (4.7) 
and are interpreted as the entropy prices in the ithsubsystem; and  ) (
i i Z p is the partition function of 
the ith subsystem as given by (3.11) with p  being replaced by  :
i p    
 




i i i Z
w
w p p                                                                                              (4.10) 
 
Insert (4.10) into (4.7) to obtain the system of equations—the counterpart of (3.13)—that determine 
the entropy price vector  :
i p  
 
              , )] ( / ) exp( [
i i i i
i x Z N
i
= ￿ - ￿
G ˛
w p w p
w
  . , , 1 I i L =                                                               (4.11) 
 
In analogy to the role of entropy prices in the economy as a whole, the emergence of entropy prices 
as determined by (4.11) and the corresponding canonical distribution (4.9) in each subsystem signal 
that the subsystem  has  reached statistical e quilibrium, i.e. its most disordered macro-state, 
compatible with the assigned vector of resources.  
 
The concept that parallels the transformation T [given by (3.14)] is the transformation ￿ ﬁ ￿
L i T :  
defined by the right-hand side of (4.11), namely  
 
              , )] ( / ) exp( [ : ) (
i i i i
i
i i x Z N T
i
= ￿ - = ￿
G ˛
w p w p p
w
  . , , 1 I i L =                       (4.12)                                       
Our discussion surrounding (3.16) implies that
i T is of class 
1 C (actually, it is of class 
¥ C ) and that 
the Jacobian matrix 




i i T DT
· ¶ ¶ = )] )( / [( : ) ( p p p  of 
i T at 
i p is negative-definite and hence non-
singular  { } . , , 1 , I i
L i L ˛ " ￿ ˛ "p As a consequence,  each image  ) (
L i T ￿  of 
L ￿  under 
i T is an open 
set




n of the  ith subsystem and  contains only 
positive vectors, i.e.  . ) (
L L i T + + ￿ ˝ ￿   
 
                                                 
34. It is not hard to show that as a consequence of this assumption, the constraints (2.9) and (3.1) are linearly 
independent and thus satisfy the NDCQ as well—we no longer need to assume this. 
35 See footnote 20.   25 
To demonstrate that a solution to (4.5)-(4.7) in fact exists, it useful to encapsulate the constraints 
,
L i p + ￿ ˛  (4.6), and (4.7) by means of the ith constraint set  
 














i i x p N p N x C
w
w w                                                                   (4.13)   
and to  restate the ith maximization problem in the form 
 










i i i i i
i N x C p p p N
w
w w                                                               (4.14)            
 
For every assignment of resources  ) (
L i i T x ￿ ˛  to the  ithsubsystem, there is an entropy vector 
L i ￿ ˛ p   such that (4.11) is satisfied; thus the associated canonical distribution (4.9) satisfies the 
constraint (4.7) and belongs to the unit simplex 
i D  [because it is a positive vector and satisfies the 
normalization condition (4.6)]. Accordingly, the constraint set (4.13) is  non-empty 
); (
L i i T x ￿ ˛ " since it is obviously compact as well a nd the statistical entropy—the objective 
function in the maximization problem (4.14)—is continuous, the Weierstrass theorem ensures that 
(4.14) has a solution. We may directly re-confirm uniqueness by noticing that the constraint set 
(4.13) is convex and the objective function in (4.14) is strictly concave. It follows that the entropy 
function   ￿ ﬁ ￿ ) ( :
L i i T S  of the ith subsystem, with  
  







˛ - = ￿
G ˛ i
i
i i i i i
i
i i N x C p p p N x S
w
w w                                                 (4.15)                   
 
is well-defined  ). , , 1 ( I i L =   
 
Since for any given  ) (
L i i T x ￿ ˛ , the problem (4.14) has a unique solution 
i i p
g
+ + ￿ ˛ , the Lagrange 
multiplier theorem  implies that  there is a  unique 
L i ￿ ˛ p such that (4.11) is satisfied, i.e. 
. ) (
i i i x T = p This entails that  the transformation ￿ ﬁ ￿
L i T :  is globally 1-1 in 
L ￿  and hence that 
there is an  inverse transformation 
1 ) (
- i T defined on the open set ) (
L i T ￿ . In view of the earlier 
established fact that 
i T is of class 
1 C with negative-definite and hence non-singular Jacobian matrix 
everywhere in its domain, it follows
36 that the inverse transformation 
1 ) (
- i T is of class 
1 C on its 
domain  ) (
L i T ￿ , and its Jacobian matrix is given by 
 
             , )) ( ( ) ( ) (
1 1 - - =
i i i i DT x T D p                                                                                               (4.16) 
 
where  ) (
i i i T x p =  or, equivalently, 
 
              ), ( ) (
1 i i i x T
- = p    { }. , , 1 ), ( I i T x
L i i L ˛ ￿ ˛                                                                       (4.17) 
                                                 
36 See footnote 21.   26 
 
Clearly, the Jacobian matrix  of the inverse transformation 
1 ) (
- i T is negative definite and non-
singular everywhere in its domain  . , , 1 ), ( I i T
L i L = ￿  
 
The properties of the transformations 
I T T , ,
1 L determine, respectively, the properties of the entropy 
functions  . , ,
1 I S S L To see this, insert  ) (w
i p  from (4.9) into the expression for statistical entropy in 
(4.14) and take into account (4.10) and (4.11) to obtain 
 
             ), ( ln ) (
i i
i
i i i i Z N x x S p p + ￿ =                                                                                           (4.18) 
 
where
i p stands for the vector-valued function (4.17). Since the latter is of class 
1 C , we infer from 
(4.18) that the entropy function  ￿ ﬁ ￿ ) ( :
L i i T S  of the subsystem  { } I i , , 1 L ˛   is of class 
1 C as 
well. Accordingly, we have the counterpart of the envelope result (3.23)   
   
             ), (
i i i x S ￿ = p     { }. , , 1 ), ( I i T x
L i i L ˛ ￿ ˛                                                                      (4.19)         
                                                                                                                             
By (4.16), (4.17), and (4.19), the entropy function is of class 
2 C and regular strictly concave. 
 
In sum,  the entropy function  ￿ ﬁ ￿ ) ( :
L i i T S  of the subsystem  { } I i , , 1 L ˛  in statistical 
equilibrium is of class 
2 C  and regular strictly concave. Once again, we may presume that there is a 
continuous extension of each 
i S on the closure of the image set ) (
L i T ￿ , which closure we take to be 
L
+ ￿  for all   { } I i , , 1 L ˛  for the sake of simplicity. In  this fashion, the entropy function of each 
subsystem is defined and continuous on
L
+ ￿  and, in addition, of class 
2 C  and regular strictly concave 
on  .
L
+ + ￿         
            
That every subsystem separately has reached statistical equilibrium is not sufficient  in itself to 
ensure that the economy  has attained  its  most disordered macro-state (in the absence of internal 
constraints or barriers to trade)—the entropy price vector may very well vary across subsystems. The 
equilibrium among subsystems is attained in Stage II: the allocation (4.1) is feasibly adjusted to 
maximize the sum of the entropy functions of the subsystems; thus an  equilibrium allocation 
associated with total supply
L
+ ￿ ˛ x  is a maximizer in the problem 
                 











i i F x x S x                                                                                                 (4.20) 





i I x S x x x ￿
=
= a L ; we shall call it the global 
entropy expression of the economy. We restrict our attention to potential solutions of (4.20) in the 
interior of  ] [x F —a presumption to be justified ex post. It is not hard to see that the rank of the 
LI L·  coefficient matrix associated with the linear system (4.3) is equal to  L and hence  the 
constraint (4.3), which defines  ] [x F  in (4.4), satisfies the NDCQ. Further, ] [x F  is obviously a   27 
convex set 
L
+ ￿ ˛ "x  and the global entropy expression of the economy is strictly concave (because it 
is the sum of strictly concave functions). Accordingly, the Lagrange multiplier theorem entails that 
an allocation 
LI x + + ￿ ˛  solves the maximization problem (4.20) if and only if there is a vector 
L ￿ ˛ l  
of Lagrange multipliers [associated with the constraints (4.3)] such that 
 
                 l = ￿ ) (
i i x S   { } . , , 1 I i L ˛ "                                                                                           (4.21) 
 
We can now show how the two-stage process for solving (3.5) works out. We first note with the aid 
of (4.19) and (4.21) that in an equilibrium allocation of resources the vectors 
i p  of multipliers get 
equalized across subsystems:                                                                                                                          
                    
                  , l p =
i   . , , 1 I i L =                                                                                                       (4.22) 
 
In turn,  we  insert (4.22)  into (4.9)-(4.11); sum (4.11) after the preceding substitution over 
{ } I i , , 1 L ˛  and take into account (4.3) to derive 
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1
x w l w l
w







                                                                         (4.23) 
                                                                                            
By inspection of (3.13) and (4.23), we see that p  and l  satisfy the same system of equations (which 
has been shown to have a unique solution (3.21) for any ) (
L T ￿ ˛ x , with the image set being 
presumed to coincide with 
L
+ + ￿ without loss of generality); hence p l =  for all  :
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x  the vector 
l  of Lagrange multipliers that was introduced in Stage II in connection with the conservation laws 
[summarized by (4.3)] coincides with the economy’s statistical equilibrium price vector p  given by 
(3.21) [presume 
L U + + ￿ = ]. It follows that                                                                                                      
 
                    { }, , , 1 ), ( )) ( (
1 I i T x
i i L ˛ " = =
- x p x p                                                                         (4.24) 
 
where, recall, 
1 - T  is the inverse of the transformation T defined by (3.14), and where 
 











i i F x x S x x x                                                                          (4.25)       
 
of course, for the statistical equilibrium associated with total endowment e we have  
 
                    { }. , , 1 ), ( )) ( (
1 I i e T e x
i i L ˛ " = =
- * p p                                                                        (4.26) 
 
Further, from (3.22), (4.3), (4.18), (4.10), and (4.25) we obtain 
 
                   ), ( )) ( ( ] [ ) ( max
1 1




















We may now summarize the two-step procedure for obtaining the most disordered macro-state of the 
economy as follows. The maximum statistical entropy principle is applied to each subsystem for an 
arbitrary allocation of resources x [as in (4.1)] among subsystems, fixing the mean action of each 
agent type. As a result we obtain an entropy function and entropy price vector for every subsystem. 
Every subsystem is in statistical equilibrium—that is, in the most disordered macro-state consistent 
with the pre-assigned allocation of resources. This is also the most disordered macro-state of the 
economy as a whole provided that the subsystems remain isolated from one another. The global 





i x S ￿
=
 is the greatest attainable disorder under these circumstances. When all 
internal constraints are removed—so that agents of different types may engage in exchange—the 
economy’s degree of maximum disorder is the maximum of the global entropy expression over the 
set  (4.4) of feasible allocations, which is determined by the total supply  vector 
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x .This 
maximization is attained via the equalization of the  entropy price of e very resource across 
subsystems.  
 
Clearly, in order for the economy to be in statistical equilibrium, it is necessary for each subsystem 
to be in equilibrium. Hence we may always presume the latter and represent each group of identical 
agents by the associated entropy function, which supplants the traditional utility function of the 
‘representative agent’ in that group. With the subsystem entropy functions known, the attainment of 
the most disordered macro-state for the economy is accomplished by finding the  equilibrium 
allocation  ) (x x  as given by (4.25), which corresponds to the concept of thermodynamic equilibrium 
in  classical  thermodynamics.  Statements ( 4.25) and (4.27) correspond to the  maximum entropy 
principle of thermodynamics
37—the principle that encompasses its standard Laws [Balian (1991, Ch. 
6)]—and Rozonoer’s equilibrium principle for ‘systems with additive effects’. The existence and 
properties of the subsystem and economy-wide entropy functions along with the maximum entropy 
principle have been derived from the statistical mechanical theory of markets (which we view as the 
economic counterpart of statistical thermodynamics).Thus the statistical   mechanical  theory of 
markets provides the foundation for a phenomenological theory of resource allocation in the image 
of classical thermodynamics, along the lines of Rozonoer (1973).  
 
 
5. The Maximum Entropy Principle Generalized: Heterogeneous Agents and Open Economies  
 
Thus far our statistical mechanical model has presumed the existence of groups of identical agents. 
This premise serves the useful function of enabling one to interpret the probability of an individual 
action as the proportion of agents (with the same preferred action set) who take that action. The 
theoretical discourse in the preceding sections should have made it apparent that such a 
presupposition is not required for the development of the statistical mechanical  formalism and the 
subsequent derivation of the maximum entropy principle. So we want to begin  by showing how 
things work out when such an assumption is abandoned.  
                                                 
37 This is a theorem rather than principle, derived from first principles, most notably the maximum 
statistical entropy principle.    29 
           
By inspection of (4.5)-(4.8) or (4.13)-(4.15), we see that the entropy function of the  ith subsystem 
can be written as  
             
                      ( ), / ) ( i
i i
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                                           (5.2) 
 
Accordingly, every agent  { } N N N N N , , , , 1 , , , 1 2 1 1 1 L L L + + ˛ n   may be considered as an 
elementary subsystem whose entropy function is given by (5.2), where  ). (n i i =  Since the agents of 
any given type  { } I i , , 1L ˛  are by definition  identical, they are characterized by the same entropy 
function. To put it otherwise, the set of traders of the ith type  
 
                    { } i i i i N N N E + + = - - 1 1 , , 1 : L ,  { }, , , 1 I i L ˛                                                                    (5.3) 
 
constitute  a composite subsystem  , ) , ( :
i E i e ˛ = E n n
n f made out of  i N  identical elementary 
subsystems
38; hence the entropy function of the ensemble of agents of type  i takes the simple form 
(5.1). It should be noted that an individual agent corresponds to a macroscopic thermodynamic 
system and not to the particle of Newtonian mechanics
39. 
 
If the agents in a certain subsystem i E  are not assumed to be identical, then the entropy function of 
that subsystem would be given by 
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i i E E
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L i i x x and E x x s x S
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n n n n n ) ( max ) (                                        (5.4) 
 
instead of (5.1). Here the entropy function 
n s of the elementary subsystem  i E ˛ n  is defined by 
 











n n n n w w
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38 We understand that  0 : 0 = N  in (5.3). 
39 See also Smith and Foley (2002) to this effect.   30 







= D ˛ = ￿
G ˛
n w
n n n n n n w w x p p x C                                                                        (5.6) 
 
As the notation in (5.5) and (5.6) indicates, the probability distribution  n w
n n w
G ˛ = )] ( [ : p p may vary 
among individual traders in i E ; it takes the canonical form (4.9), with the index  i in (4.9)-(4.11) 
being replaced by n  and the range  i E  of the latter taking the place of the range of the former. 
n D is 
the  1 - n g  dimensional unit simplex, where  n g  is the cardinality of the preferred action set 
n G  of 
agent . n  As  indicated in (5.6),  the assignment of the vector of resources 
L x + ￿ ˛
n  to agent  n  
amounts to specifying the expected value of her action. Recalling that the cardinality n g  of 
n G  has 
been presumed to be a large positive integer, we may comfortably posit that n g < +1 L ; accordingly, 
we may invoke the maximum statistical entropy principle to determine the most disordered macro-
state [as described by the maximization problem (5.5)] of the elementary subsystem , n  which turns 
out to be the canonical distribution. When the latter prevails, trader n  is said to be an elementary 
equilibrium subsystem. 
 
The above generalization regarding heterogeneous agents may be extended to any segment of a pure 
exchange economyE, including  Eitself.  The determination and interpretation of statistical 
equilibrium prices along with the maximum entropy principle of the phenomenological theory hold 
true when all  N agents in  E are heterogeneous. Of course, the pertinent formulas and equations 
would have to be modified accordingly. A macro-state of the economy E is now specified by the N-
list  ) , , ( :
1 N p p p L = of probability vectors  , )] ( [ : n n
n n w
G ˛ = p p   { } . , , 1 N L ˛ n The normalization 
conditions (2.9), the form (2.11) of the statistical entropy of p, the market-clearing condition (3.1), 
and the constraint set (3.2) are, respectively, modified as follows:  
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where  . :
1 N D · · D = D L  The statistical equilibrium (3.5) is now given by the appropriate 
modifications of (3.10) and (3.12): 
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The system of equations (3.13) that determines the entropy price vector p  now reads 
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= G ˛
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Z                                                                     (5.13) 
 
We may next recast the two-stage procedure [as developed in Section 4] for arriving at the most 
disordered macro-state (5.11) of the pure exchange economy  Eas follows. In Stage I, we obtain the 
most disordered macro-state of every elementary subsystem  { } N , , 1 L ˛ n  associated with an 
arbitrary allocation  , ) , , ( :
1 LN N x x x + ￿ ˛ = L  where 
L
L x x x + ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( : 1
n n n L  is the vector of resources 
assigned to trader  . n That is, we solve the maximization problem (5.5), and determine an entropy 
function
n s  for each trader or elementary subsystem { } N , , 1 L ˛ n . In Stage II, the allocation x is 
feasibly adjusted to maximize the global entropy expression of the economy, which in this instance 
is equal to the sum of the entropy functions of the economy’s elementary subsystems. Thus the 
equilibrium allocation  ) (x x associated with total supply 
L
+ ￿ ˛ x is given by the counterpart of (4.25) 
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with the set of feasible allocations (4.4) being appropriately modified to read 
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The entropy function of the economy S, defined by  
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is equal to the maximized global entropy expression and hence the sum of the entropies of the 
elementary subsystems, evaluated at the equilibrium allocation (5.14):   
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Statements (5.14) and (5.17) constitute a more general version of the maximum entropy principle 
when an exchange economy is considered as a composite of its elementary subsystems with no 
assumption of classes of homogeneous agents. The derivation of the principle from (5.16) would 
proceed pretty much along the lines of the argument developed in Section 4 so it will be omitted.   32 
Likewise, the properties of the entropy functions are identical with those established in Sections 3 
and 4  and so are the methods of proof. In a nutshell, the entropy function of an elementary 
equilibrium subsystem or any equilibrium finite collection of such subsystems (with no internal 
constraints) is of class 
2 C  and regular strictly concave on  ;
L
+ + ￿ it may be assumed to be defined and 
continuous on the entire resource space  .
L
+ ￿  
 
In most general terms, we may consider an isolated exchange economy which is a composite system 
made out of an arbitrary collection of J subsystems, indexed by  { }, , , 1 J j L ˛  where J is a positive 
integer. Each subsystem is an exchange economy itself of the form (2.2) for an appropriate choice of 
N, possibly an elementary one consisting of a single agent. An equilibrium subsystem j (that is, a 
subsystem j in the most disordered macro-state, given the vector of resources allocated to  it) is 
associated with a continuous entropy function  , ), (
L j j j j x x S x + ￿ ˛ a  which is of class 
2 C  and 
regular  strictly concave on
L
+ + ￿ ; an  allocation  among the  J  subsystems is an ordered 
list
LJ J x x x + ￿ ˛ = ) , , ( :
1 L ; for any predetermined  total supply 
L
+ ￿ ˛ x , the conservation laws are 
summarized by 






                                                                                                               (5.18)             
 
rather than by (4.3). Correspondingly, the set of feasible allocations  ] [x F  is now given by 
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rather than by (4.4) or (5.15); and an equilibrium allocation  ) (x x  [associated with total supply x ] is 
defined via an appropriate modification of (4.25) or (5.14): 
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That the maximization problem 
 











j j x x S x   ,
L
+ ￿ ˛ x                                                                       (5.21) 
 
has a solution follows from the fact that the global entropy expression (which is the objective 
function) is continuous and the constraint set (5.19) is non-empty and compact. From the functional 
form  of the statistical entropy and the maximum-statistical-entropy underpinnings of the 
phenomenological theory we may infer that a solution to (5.21) should have no zero components; 
accordingly, the solution to (5.21) is also unique [as anticipated by (5.20)]. This is so because the 
global entropy expression is strictly concave on 
LJ
+ + ￿  and 
LJ
+ + ￿ ˙ F ] [x   is non-empty and convex for 
.
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x Once again, the entropy function  ￿ ﬁ ￿+
L S :   of the composite system in statistical   33 
equilibrium is equal to the sum of the entropies of the equilibrium subsystems—the counterpart of 
(4.27) or (5.17) reads 
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In the context of pure exchange economies, we may view statements (5.20) and (5.22) as the most 
general formulation of the maximum entropy principle—which is the fundamental principle of the 
phenomenological theory of resource allocation. This is in effect the theory of ‘systems with additive 
effects’ of Rozonoer (1973, Paper I). But here the existence and properties of the entropy functions 
(twice continuously differentiable,  regular  strictly concave) as well as the maximum entropy 
principle are all derived from the statistical  mechanical  theory of markets (rather than being 
postulated). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the equilibrium behavior of  a composite system as a whole is fully 
determined by its entropy function—we do not need to know the make up of the system that gives 
rise to the latter. Once the entropy function of the composite system is known,  the equilibrium 
entropy price vector is determined by the envelope result (3.23) [with
L U + + ￿ = ]. Further, from (5.19) 
and (5.20)  it follows that the equilibrium allocation  (5.20)  is fully  determined by the entropy 
functions of the equilibrium subsystems.  
                                                                                                                                
Even though the foundations of the phenomenological theory are provided by the statistical 
equilibrium model of pure exchange, we should view the former theory as an autonomous level of 
analysis. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the needs of the phenomenological theory itself dictate 
some additional restrictions on entropy functions. Some of them are merely simplifying assumptions 
(e.g. assumptions that ensure that all components of the equilibrium allocation vector are positive), 
while others are more substantive desiderata (e.g. that entropy prices should be positive), suggesting 
the need for adding   more structure at the level of statistical equilibrium theory. Thus in reference to 
the maximization  problem  (5.6) we  posit that for every  { } , , , 1 J j L ˛  the entropy function 
￿ ﬁ ￿+
L j S :  (aside from being continuous and, by statistical equilibrium theory, of class 
2 C  and 
regular strictly concave  on
L
+ + ￿ ) has the following  additional p roperties
40: (a) 
j S has positive 
partial derivatives on
L
+ + ￿ , namely 
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(b) 
j S satisfies the Inada conditions 
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40 The adoption of properties (a) and (b) is after Rozonoer (1973).   34 
The Inada condition (5.24) ensures that the non-negativity constraint on x is not binding at a solution 
of    the maximization problem (5.21),  without having to invoke its statistical-equilibrium 
underpinning.  
 
With the above additional properties, entropy functions may take the Cobb-Douglas form: 
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This is an illustration of what should be apparent on general grounds: the entropy function of an 
equilibrium system, whether elementary or not, looks like a neoclassical utility function. But even if 
an equilibrium subsystem consists of a single trader, the associated entropy function is  not a 
representation of the trader’s preference ordering  of alternative resource (consumption) bundles. 
Preferences or wants do affect the preferred action sets and, as a consequence, the entropy functions, 
but the latter do not represent those wants. There is no implication that a situation like 
), ( ) (
j j j j y S x S >   , ,
L j j y x + ￿ ˛  signifies any sort of superiority of 
j x over 
j y (in terms of preference 
or welfare) in the eyes of the agents that constitute the  jthsubsystem. 
 
Rozonoer (1973) treats the entropy function—his structure function—as analogous to utility in his 
systems with non-additive effects or as analogous to profit or revenue in his systems with additive 
effects. There is indeed, as we have already mentioned a deep correspondence of thermodynamic 
entropy (the analogue of our entropy function) to neoclassical utility [Candeal et al. (2001), Smith 
and Foley (2002)]. That such a connection is absent  in our approach reflects our premise that 
statistical thermodynamics is the fundamental theory; classical or macroscopic thermodynamics is 
basically derived from the latter. In more discipline-neutral terms, our point of entry to the study of 
pure-exchange economies is their probabilistic description and the maximum statistical entropy 
principle (consistently with the statistical theory of markets of Foley). The entropy function of the 
phenomenological theory is just the maximum of the statistical entropy over the set of probability 
distributions compatible with the resource constraints on mean actions.  This is precisely the 
perspective that emanates from statistical physics [Balian (1991, p. 247)].  
 
The significance of the requirement (5.23) becomes apparent once we write the conditions that 
characterize (5.20). The conservation laws (5.18) do satisfy the NDCQ—it is easy to see that the 
LJ L·  matrix associated with the linear system (5.18) has rank L. Hence the Lagrange multiplier 
theorem is applicable  to the maximization problem (5.21)—that the other assumptions of the 
theorem besides the NDCQ are satisfied should be obvious. Accordingly, for every total supply 
vector  ,
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x  the solution 
LJ x x + + ￿ ˛ = ) ( : x  to (5.21) and the vector 
L ￿ ˛ = ) ( : x p p  of Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the conservation laws (5.18) satisfy the first-order conditions 
 
                    , ) ( p = ￿
j j x S   . , , 1 J j L =                                                                                          (5.27) 
  
In view of the statistical  mechanical underpinning of the phenomenological model, the multipliers 
are the equilibrium  entropy prices, which now, in view of (5.23) and (5.27) and the fact that 
,
LJ x + + ￿ ˛ are all positive.              
    35 
We may (locally) invert (5.27) to obtain 
J x x , ,
1 L as vector-valued functions of the entropy price 
vector p  and subsequently insert them into (5.18)—which summarizes the economy’s conservation 
laws—to yield the system of equations that implicitly determines p  as a vector-valued function of 
the total supply  .
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x  The solution of (5.27) is in turn determined as a J-list  of vector-valued 
functions of  x  and hence so is the economy-wide entropy function (5.22). The relationship between 
total supply and entropy prices is also captured by the envelope result 
 
                   ). (x p S ￿ =                                                                                                                    (5.28) 
 
Since the entropy function S is of class 
2 C  and regular strictly concave on
L
+ + ￿ , the transformation 
(5.28)  has a local 
1 C inverse, denoted by  ); (p x x =  this local inverse would become useful in 
situations in which entropy prices rather the amounts of resources in the economy play the role of 
independent variables. Such situations may indeed materialize when an exchange economy  E is 
open; the maximum entropy principle is then applicable not to the economy  E per se but to the 
isolated composite system made out of E and its complement or environment
c E . The latter consists 
of all agents outside the economy  E with whom its members engage in trade—so
c E is the ‘rest of 
the world’ outsideE, viewed as another pure exchange economy with the same resource space 
.
L ￿ The pertinent total endowment of the composite system would be the vector sum of the total 
endowments of  E and
c E . Letting 
L c e + + ￿ ˛ and 
c S be the total endowment and the entropy function 
of  ,
c E  respectively, the equilibrium allocation of resources  ) ˆ , ˆ (
c x x  between the economyEand its 
environment
c E  is determined   by the maximum entropy principle: 
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Typically, the entropy price vector of an exchange economy varies with the amounts of resources 
that are available to the economy—see, for example, equation (5.28) and recall the general 
properties of entropy functions or think of the Cobb-Douglass form (5.26). But it is of special 
interest to consider systems with linear entropy functions, i.e. economies whose entropy price vector 
is not affected by the amounts of their resources. These are Rozonoer’s ‘unsaturatable systems’, 
which are generalized versions of the ‘thermal reservoirs’ of thermodynamics
41. Accordingly, we 
propose to call the system with a linear entropy function a  resource reservoir
42.  Suppose, in 
particular, that the environment 
c E  of  the economy  E  is a  resource reservoir with the entropy 
function  
 
                , : ) (
c c c S x p x ￿ =                                                                                                               (5.30) 
 
                                                 
41 See, for example, Callen (1985, p.106). 
42 The reservoir here encompasses all resources, although one could introduce a separate reservoir for each 
resource. If a “small” subsystem is in equilibrium with a “large” subsystem, then under appropriate 
conditions the large subsystem functions as a resource reservoir for the small subsystem [Rozonoer (1973), 
Paper I].    36 
where p  is a predetermined vector in  .
L
+ + ￿  In view of (5.29) and (5.30), the equilibrium allocation  
x ˆ  for the economy Esatisfies (5.28) at   p p =  and hence it is given by the value  ) ( ˆ p x x =  of the 
local inverse of (5.28) at   . p  
 
When an exchange  economyEis open and in equilibrium with a resource reservoir,  it is more 
usefully described by the Legendre transform of its entropy function: 
 
                { } ), ( )) ( ( ) ( max : ) ( p x p p x x x p x p ￿ - = ￿ ˛ ￿ - = P + S S
L                                                 (5.31) 
 
where  ) (p x x =  is the local inverse of (5.28). The validity of the last expression in (5.31) derives 
from the observation that the maximizer of  x p x x ￿ - ) ( S a  is characterized by (5.28). Assumption 
(5.25) on S (in addition to its other properties) is crucial
43 for ensuring that (5.28) has a local 
1 C  
inverse for every  .
L
+ + ￿ ˛ x  The function (5.31) is a ‘thermodynamic potential’ in the vocabulary of 
thermodynamics; we call P the characteristic function of the economyE[after Rosonoer (1973)].  
 
By (5.31), the characteristic function is of class 
1 C and hence the envelope theorem applies to yield  
 
               ), ( ) ( p p x P -￿ =                                                                                                              (5.32) 
 
which in turn establishes that in effect P is of class 
2 C  on  .
L
+ + ￿ Further, from (5.28) and (5.32) it 
follows that the characteristic function  Pis regular strictly convex ( on account of the entropy 
function being regular strictly concave). Equation (5.32) makes it clear that the characteristic 
function fully describes the equilibrium properties of a small open economy—an economy in 
equilibrium with the ‘rest of the world’, functioning as a resource reservoir for the economy in 
discussion. The equilibrium allocation  x ˆ  pertaining to (5.29)-(5.30) is obtained by simply 
calculating the gradient of the characteristic function at ‘world prices’ p : 
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The existence and properties of the characteristic function have a transparent statistical mechanical 
foundation. In the model of Sections 3 and 4 with groups of homogeneous agents,  a mere 
comparison of equations (3.22)-(3.23) with (5.31) yields 
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When all agents are heterogeneous, it is not hard to see from (5.8), (5.11), (5.12), and (5.16) that the 
counterpart of equation (3.22) is 
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43 This is our reading  of Theorem B in Rozonoer (1973, Paper I).    37 
 
and hence (5.34) generalizes to 
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6. Concluding Remarks  
 
Theory construction in economics along the lines of statistical and classical thermodynamics is both 
possible and fruitful. The cornerstone  for this endeavor is the generalized statistical mechanics 
pioneered by E. T. Jaynes, which is independent of any physical properties. As a showcase of this 
approach, we have presented a comprehensive theory of pure exchange economies, inspired by the 
statistical equilibrium  theory of markets of Foley and the generalized thermodynamics of resource 
allocation of Rozonoer.  Our theoretical discourse  is  grounded  on a probabilistic description of 
general systems and a self-contained account of the arguments that lead to the concept of statistical 
entropy as a measure of uncertainty or disorder and the maximum statistical entropy principle.  
 
Naturally, the statistical mechanical mode of theorizing has  to rely on microeconomics for 
specifying the spectrum of all possible micro-states of the system under investigation—which in this 
essay is a pure exchange economy. A key contribution of the Foley model pertains exactly to this 
point—the description of agents by their ‘transaction set’, namely the set of trades that they  are 
willing and able to carry out. We have adopted a more or less neoclassical version of this concept, 
the preferred action set—the set of actions or resource bundles which in the trader’s preference scale 
are at least as good as  her  initial  endowment.  While the description of the agents is  largely 
neoclassical (but with less restrictive assumptions about preferences), the concept of  statistical 
equilibrium  is distinctly non-Walrasian—equilibrium entropy prices  clear the markets by 
appropriately distributing traders over their preferred action sets, rather than by coordinating their 
utility-maximizing choices (as in the Arrow-Debreu model). Aside from requiring that the relevant 
constraints should be independent, the main assumption needed for the propositions of the statistical 
mechanical model is shown to be disarmingly simple—we only need to posit that the cardinality of y 
preferred action set of every trader is sufficiently high.   
 
One of the main results of this essay is the proposition that the statistical mechanical model of 
markets gives rise to a phenomenological theory of resource allocation  in the image of classical 
thermodynamics. Crucial in the demonstration of this proposition is the concept of the entropy 
function and its properties—defined as the maximum value function associated with the constrained 
maximization of statistical entropy. Thus the entropy function of the pure exchange economy under 
discussion is just the maximized statistical entropy, viewed as a function of the vector of resources in 
the economy. The entropy function of any segment of the economy (or subsystem) is defined in a 
similar fashion.  The equilibrium behavior of an exchange economy or any of its subsystems is fully 
characterized by its entropy function. With this concept in place, we have been able to portray the 
establishment of statistical equilibrium as a two-stage optimization process; the second stage of the 
process yields the fundamental principle of the phenomenological theory.  
   38 
More specifically, in the first stage of the process, we partition  the economy into a collection of 
notionally isolated subsystems and assign an arbitrary allocation of resources among them. We let 
each separate subsystem attain statistical equilibrium and thus determine its entropy function. In the 
second stage, we let the subsystems interact through the unrestrained exchange of resources; it is 
shown that the attainment of maximum disorder in the economy is tantamount to finding a feasible 
allocation among the subsystems (i.e. an allocation obeying the resource conservation laws) that 
maximizes the global entropy expression of the economy, namely the sum of the subsystem entropy 
functions. The entropy function corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, and the just described 
constrained maximization of the global entropy expression corresponds to the maximum entropy 
principle of classical thermodynamics; it is the fundamental principle of  the phenomenological 
theory of resource allocation. Thus the principle of maximum entropy here emerges not by analogy 
to its thermodynamic counterpart (as, for instance, in the Rosonoer system) but as a proposition 
derived from the maximum statistical entropy principle in the context of a pure exchange economy.    
 
When an exchange economy is open, the maximum entropy principle is then applicable not to the 
economy per se but to the composite system made out of the economy and its environment. In the 
case of a small open economy, its environment functions like a resource reservoir, fixing the entropy 
price vector f or the economy. The vector of resources in the economy is now determined 
endogenously (as a result of unrestricted trade with the rest of the world) by means of the economy’s 
characteristic function, which a Legendre transform of its entropy function.  The  characteristic 
function of the economy has a transparent micro foundation: it is shown to be equal to the sum of the 
natural logarithms of the partition functions of the individual traders that constitute the economy in 
discussion.  
 
The derivation of the principle of maximum entropy from first economic principles opens the way 
for the systematic use of the vast analytical apparatus of  equilibrium and non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics in economic theory. While t here is still a lot of ground to be covered at the 
equilibrium level,  it is worth  noticing  that the exploration of the workings of  ‘process 
thermodynamics’ in an economic context  is now  within reach as well.  Indeed, our two-stage 
optimization procedure points out to the possibility of local equilibrium (i.e. the economy is made 
out of parts  which are  separately  in equilibrium) without  global or  economy-wide  equilibrium. 
Loosely speaking, this observation corresponds to the starting point of nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics [Kondepudi and Prigogine (1998, Ch. 15)]
44.       
 
If one is willing to accept the interpretation of probability as state of  knowledge—which is the 
interpretation that underlies the generalized statistical mechanics of Jaynes—then we can dispense 
with the assumption of the Foley model that the ensemble of an economy’s agents is partitioned into 
large equivalence classes  of  agent types.  The statistical mechanical theory of pure exchange 
economies holds true even in situations of completely  heterogeneous traders.  Every agent is an 
elementary subsystem, with a determinate entropy function. The latter looks like a neoclassical 
utility function, but it is a fundamentally different concept. It allows us to state our best prediction 
regarding the agent’s behavior when the only information about the probability distribution over her 
preferred action set is the expected value of her action. 
 
                                                 
44 See Isard and Liossatos (1979) for some earlier attempts to use the Prigogine version of nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics in spatial economics.   39 
This brings us to a host of methodological issues surrounding the use of the probability formalism, 
which  warrant further investigation.  The general question of how probability is to be understood 
even in the context of statistical physics is still a subject of debate
45. We need more clarity on this 
matter in economics as well, especially when we envision probability at the foundation of economic 
theory. We will take up the theme of the concept of probability in generalized statistical mechanics 
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